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ESSAY
A Non-Power Looks at Separation of Powers
ALAN B. MORRISON*

I. INTRODUCTION

Separation of powers has been a growth area of constitutional law in the
1970s and 1980s. As a frequent participant in separation of powers litigation, I am arguably one of the least appropriate persons to assess the results
of this litigation. My apparent inappropriateness is due, in part, to the fact
that observers may interpret some of my views as "sour grapes" over lost
causes and cases. Undaunted by that possibility, however, I have nonetheless
attempted to distill some degree of coherence in the separation of powers
area and to offer a few suggestions for change.
First, a disclaimer. I have no illusions that I have found the Rosetta stone
that will decipher a unified theory of separation of powers and allow the
reader to predict the outcome of future separation of powers cases with total,
or even significant, accuracy. I do not believe that I can fully explain all of
the past cases, and I have not tried to fit every aspect of every case into the
approaches described below. The fact that I cannot explain everything, however, does not deter me from trying to explain the major trends.
In Part II of this essay, I describe three basic approaches used to analyze
separation of powers cases: (1) does the challenged action transgress specific
provisions in the Constitution; (2) does the challenged action constitute an
encroachment on the powers of another branch (an encroachment may be
either "active" or "passive," terms that I have created and define below); or
(3) does the challenged action substantially impair the ability of one branch
to carry out its constitutionally mandated responsibilities? In Part III, I ask
whether, in dealing with these three types of challenges, the courts have appropriately responded to three questions that have troubled observers: (1)
have the courts tied the hands of Congress too tightly, thereby freezing our
* Mr. Morrison, a Washington attorney, is the director of the Public Citizen Litigation Group.
This essay is based on the Phillip A. Hart lecture that he gave at Georgetown University Law
Center on April 6, 1989. It has been revised to take into account subsequent separation of powers
developments and insights that the author obtained from his colleagues and from conducting a
separation of powers workshop at Harvard Law School in January 1990. This essay has benefitted
greatly from the insightful comments of Litigation Group attorneys David C. Vladeck and Patti A.
Goldman, who worked with the author on many of the cases mentioned in the essay, and from
Georgetown Professor of Law Roy A. Schotland, who noted a number of errors in analysis before
they reached the final stage.
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system of government in the past and failing to take into account the circumstances of twentieth century governance in the United States; (2) have the
courts given Congress too much freedom to delegate legislative functions to
other branches; and (3) has the proper role of the judicial branch been found,
or in some instances has the judiciary been assigned too much that does not
involve adjudication and in other instances have some types of cases been
improperly removed from the judicial domain? Plainly here my judgments
are personal, but because I am not a member of any of the branches of government at least my views remain unaffected by an institutional bias in favor
of one branch or another.' Finally, in Part IV of this essay, I try to identify
the reasons for the recent increase in separation of powers litigation and ask
what, if anything, those in power can and should do to try to prevent or
encourage such litigation.
Before turning to these questions, however, I want to state my view--one
that I believe the Framers shared--of the doctrine of separation of powers.
The purpose of making the separation of powers doctrine the bedrock of the
Constitution was not to divide our government into three equal teams, like a
professional sports league, so that the competition between them would be as
equal as possible. Under such an approach, the doctrine of separation of
powers would tolerate any alteration in the power structure as long as none
of the other players objected to the intrusion into their territory. Thus, if
judges wanted to issue advisory opinions, or members of Congress wanted to
serve part-time as judges, that would be acceptable as long as the other
2
branches did not object.
My view is rather different. As I read the history of the doctrine and the
purposes behind it, the Framers included separation of powers in the Constitution to protect all of the people, not just those who happen to occupy the
three branches of government on a temporary lease from the nation's citizens. In formulating separation of powers doctrine, the Framers were concerned with two separate, but related matters: (1) the need to avoid an
excessive concentration of power in one branch, particularly the Congress,
because of the resulting threat of tyranny; and (2) the need to assure the
people that they were being governed by their elected representatives, principally the members of Congress, to whom they had ceded the great powers of
the Constitution. These two concerns, which are too often ignored, should
1. It is perhaps because the Framers of the Constitution did not know for certain whether they
would be part of the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the government that the final document proved to be such a balanced one and that the doctrine of separation of powers, including the
checks and balances built into it, works so well.
2. The incompatibility clause might well create an independent barrier in the latter case. U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2.
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govern the applicability of separation of powers doctrine in deciding whether
a particular action meets the requirements of the Constitution.
II. AVENUES OF CHALLENGE
A. TEXTUAL VIOLATIONS

When passing on constitutional questions, one ought at least to begin with
the words and history of the Constitution. Surprisingly, even though almost
200 years have passed since the framing of our Constitution, several recent
separation of powers challenges have been resolved in large part by use of the
literal language of the Constitution-or at least by use of that language as
interpreted in light of the gloss that has been applied to it over time.
One provision that has been used to answer several of these separation of
powers questions is the appointments clause, which grants to the President
the power to:
nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate... appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the
supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established
by Law; but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of
3
Law, or in the Heads of Departments.
While at first blush this provision seems to be rather mechanical, it in fact
embodies a significant commitment to presidential power, albeit with certain
limitations and subject to a senatorial check. It is often forgotten that the
appointments clause was at the heart of the dispute underlying Marbury v.
Madison,4 and that the Supreme Court more recently has relied almost entirely on the clause in striking down the composition of the Federal Election
Commission in Buckley v. Valeo,5 and in upholding the appointment of an
6
independent counsel in Morrison v. Olson.
The Supreme Court used the text of the Constitution in United States v.
Will 7 in determining when certain statutory provisions respecting pay increases of judges became effective and thus ran afoul of the restriction in
article III that the compensation of federal judges "shall not be diminished"
3. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
4. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
5. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
6. 487 U.S. 654 (1988). To a lesser degree in Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926), the
Supreme Court relied on the absence of any constitutional provision for Senate approval of the
President's removal of officers appointed by him to overturn a statute requiring such approval. Id.
at 161.
7. 449 U.S. 200 (1980).
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during their term in office." Federal courts have had occasion, most recently
in Barnes v. Kline,9 to resolve disputes about whether an attempted pocket
veto by the President meets the standards of the Constitution by focusing on
the nettlesome phrase "unless the Congress by their Adjournment prevent
[the] Return" 10 of the bill. The courts have also rejected claims that Congress violated the ascertainment clause" when it delegated to the President
the power to set the salaries of members of Congress, which according to the
Constitution shall be "ascertained by Law." 12 In another recent separation
of powers confrontation, the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia (D.C. Circuit) focused on the text and history of the treaty
clause and decided that neither Congress as a whole, nor the Senate alone,
had the right to insist upon approving our withdrawal from a treaty to which
13
we were a signatory.
In other cases, indeed in most other separation of powers cases, the Court
cites provisions of the Constitution in reaching its decisions. In most of these
cases, however, no one seriously contends that either the text or its history,
as opposed to the general policies emanating from the provisions, provides
any real guidance in answering the question before the Court. Even in cases
in which the text of the Constitution does provide significant guidance, the
4
Court has also relied on policy considerations to support its analysis.'
B. ENCROACHMENT

More than 60 years ago, in Springer v. Government of the Philippine Islands,15 the Supreme Court observed that
[iut may be stated then, as a general rule inherent in the American constitutional system, that, unless otherwise expressly provided or incidental to the
powers conferred, the legislature cannot exercise either executive or judicial power; the executive cannot exercise either legislative or judicial6
power; the judiciary cannot exercise either executive or legislative power. '
Thus, unless there is a specific exception in the Constitution, such as the
President's role in enacting laws or the Senate's role in approving appoint8. Id. at 218.
9. 759 F.2d 21 (D.C. Cir. 1985), vacated as moot sub nom. Burke v. Barnes, 479 U.S. 361 (1987).
10. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.

11. Id. § 6, cl. 1.
12. See Humphrey v. Baker, 848 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 491 (1988);
Pressler v. Simon, 428 F. Supp. 302 (D.D.C. 1976), aff'd sub nom. Pressler v. Blumenthal, 434 U.S.
1028 (1978).
13. Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), vacated on justiciability grounds,

444 U.S. 996 (1979).
14. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 129 (1976) (referring to Framers' fear concerning legislative

aggrandizement).
15. 277 U.S. 189 (1928).

16. Id. at 201-02.
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ments and treaties, whenever one branch encroaches on another, there is a
potential separation of powers problem. The fact of encroachment alone has
not, however, been dispositive in all separation of powers cases. Instead,
while the Court has been unwilling to allow active encroachment-in which
the encroaching branch, typically the Congress, assigns to itself the functions
of another branch-the Court has been much more tolerant when the encroachment is passive-when the branch that is encroached upon, typically
Congress, with the concurrence of the President, has assigned its own functions to another part of the government.
1. Active Encroachment
Active encroachment occurs when one branch decides to undertake some
of the functions of another branch. The leading modern active encroachment case is Immigration & NaturalizationService v. Chadha,17 in which the
Supreme Court issued a blanket condemnation of the legislative veto mechanism by which Congress sought to exercise continuing control over a wide
variety of decisions of the executive branch, not by passing new legislation,
but simply by having one or both houses of Congress exercise a veto over
executive actions. Although the Court's opinion discusses the provisions of
the Constitution relating to bicameralism and presentment, the real thrust of
Chadha is that Congress had taken on a role not assigned to it by the Constitution, and hence violated the separation of powers by encroaching upon the
8
role of the executive branch.'
In Bowsher v. Synar,19 the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional the
role of the Comptroller General under the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act
because Congress could discharge him. 20 The underlying difficulty with the
statute, and the role of the Comptroller General under it, however, was that
the Comptroller General was an agent of Congress and was directed to execute federal laws, a role the Constitution granted to the executive, not the
legislative branch. The fact that Congress wrote the law that unconstitutionally added to its own powers made the violation more egregious, and brought
forth the specter of Congress trying to unite in the legislative branch the
power to both write and execute the laws. It is this coalescence of power in
the Office of Comptroller General, rather than any technical distinctions between the power of Congress to remove the Comptroller General and the
constitutional power of Congress to remove all officers in the executive and
judicial branches, including the President, by impeachment, that is a proper
basis for treating the congressional removal power in this case as
17.
18.
19.
20.

462 U.S. 919 (1983).
Id. at 955-58.
478 U.S. 714 (1986).
Id. at 720-26.
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extraordinary. 2 1
President Truman's unsuccessful attempt to take over the steel mills in
Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer,22 exemplifies active encroachment by
the President if one accepts the proposition that in acting the President was
relying principally on his inherent powers as Commander-in-Chief. One
could also read the case, however, as involving only a rather attenuated claim
by the President that existing statutes gave him the power to seize the steel
mills to maintain the status quo. Perhaps because of the extensive reach of
the President's claim, Youngstown seems more like an encroachment case
than a dispute about statutory powers, although in terms of outcome, the
debate is largely academic. As Youngstown illustrates, there is no bright line
between disputes about statutory powers and claims of encroachment, at
least when the President has a plausible argument that Congress has authorized him to undertake the challenged action. Because of the plethora of
modem statutes available to the President to justify the exercise of a Presidential power, and to the Court if it wishes to sustain such exercise, 23 there
have been almost no recent lawsuits involving presidential encroachment,
unless every suit alleging that the President exceeded his powers under a
24
statute is considered to raise encroachment issues.
2. Passive Encroachment
In contrast to Chadha, Bowsher, and Youngstown, in which the encroaching party decided on its own to undertake new functions, passive encroachment occurs when one branch delegates to another branch functions not
normally performed by that branch. Courts and commentators have not
21. Similarly, although Buckley v. Valeo involved a textual violation of the appointments clause,
Congress compounded the problem by giving itself the right to appoint four of the six Federal
Election Commissioners and by giving the House, in addition to the Senate, the right to consent to
the appointment of the two chosen by the President. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 113 (1976).
22. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
23. See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 669-72 (1981) (Court relied on the "sweeping
and unqualified" language of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act to uphold an
executive agreement with Iran to arbitrate claims by American citizens against the government of
Iran).
24. One area where it may appear that some recent Presidents have attempted aggrandizements
of power is impoundment, a practice under which the President directs that less than all the money
that Congress has appropriated for a program be spent. In no case has a President relied on his
inherent powers to justify an impoundment, but instead has relied either on statutory language or
legislative history that purports to give the President the power not to spend. See Train v. City of
New York, 420 U.S. 35 (1975). The reason for this Presidential reliance on statutes may be that
Chief Justice Rehnquist, in his earlier capacity as head of the Office of Legal Counsel in the Department of Justice, gave an opinion that the President had no such inherent authority. Impoundment
of Appropriated Funds by the President: Joint Hearings on S. 373 Before the Ad Hoc Subcomm. on
Impoundment of Funds of the Senate Comm. on Government Operationsand the Subcom. of Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary. 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 394-95 (1973) (statement of William H. Rehnquist, Asst. Att'y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel).
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used the term "passive encroachment." In Buckley v. Valeo, 25 the Court
used the phrase "encroachment or aggrandizement," seemingly equating the
two. 26 While the latter term is more commonly used, it does not lend itself to
accompaniment by an adjective like "passive" and does not apply if, for example, Congress were to assign a function of the judicial branch to the executive, a situation in which Congress would not be increasing its own powers.
Passive encroachment usually arises in the context of congressional delegations to the executive. In these instances, the question is whether Congress
may constitutionally delegate its power to another branch. In marked contrast to the Supreme Court's early passive encroachment decision setting
aside the National Recovery Act in A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United
States,27 the courts in recent years have been unanimous in their refusal to
overturn statutes on the ground of excessive delegation. 28 While Schecter
can be distinguished from the more recent cases because the power was
largely assigned to private parties rather than to another branch of government, the change in judicial attitude towards passive encroachment between
Schecter and the recent decisions is startling.
In Synar v. United States,29 for example, the three-judge district court
panel opined in dicta that the delegation to the Comptroller General was
within the confines of the "intelligible principle" test set forth in J. W. Hampton & Co. v. United States.30 The court upheld this delegation even though
the Comptroller General was given unreviewable and legislatively-uncontrolled discretion to determine all of the decisive factors that enter into estimating the budget deficit, including such items as the rate of inflation, the
amount of the trade deficit, the overall interest rates, and the unemployment
31
rate.
Similarly, in Mistretta v. United States,3 2 the Supreme Court rejected a
challenge to a delegation of power to the Sentencing Commission, largely
because the delegation was contained within a very detailed statute which
33
answered a number of questions regarding the Commission's discretion.
25. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
26. Id. at 12.
27. 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
28. See Mistretta v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 647, 655 (1989) ("[Since invalidating two statutes
as excessive delegations in 1935,] we have upheld, again without deviation, Congress' ability to

delegate power under broad standards.").
29. 626 F. Supp. 1374, 1383, 1387-88 (D.D.C.), aff'd, 478 U.S. 714 (1986). The district court in
Synar also held the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act unconstitutional on "active encroachment"
grounds. Id at 1403; see supra text accompanying notes 19-21.
30. Synar, 626 F. Supp. at 1383 (citing J.W. Hampton & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 406,
409 (1928)).
31. Synar, 626 F. Supp. at 1403.
32. 109 S.Ct. 647 (1989).
33. Id. at 655.
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Most of the questions that the statute resolved, however, were on the periphery of the Commission's debates about sentencing policy. Everyone recognized, therefore, that Congress had left to the Commission's discretion most
of the major policy choices. Among the issues on which the Commission had
virtually complete discretion were the relative seriousness of each crime; the
availability of probation; whether fines should be imposed, and, if so, in what
amounts; and what factors in aggravation or mitigation, both as to the crime
itself and the background of the defendant, could or must be considered in
imposing a sentence. 34 In these areas the Commission's discretion was only
occasionally subject to governing statutes other than the Sentencing Reform
Act, principally those setting maximum or minimum sentences.
Even when the statutory language is sparse, the courts have upheld broad
delegations of congressional authority. For example, in Humphrey v.
Baker,35 the D.C. Circuit upheld the Federal Salary Act, which at the time
allowed the President to set salaries for senior federal officials at whatever
level he "deem[ed] advisable."' 36 This enabled the President to raise or, with
the exception of federal judges, lower those salaries by any amount, and alter
the historical relation of salaries among the branches or among officials
within each branch as he alone saw fit.
In each of these three cases, the text of the delegation made clear that no
judicial review of the delegatee's adherence to the statute was available. Furthermore, even if judicial review had been available, the statutes provided no
standards that a court could apply to determine whether there was compliance with the will of Congress.
There is another group of cases that also fits in the passive encroachment
category. I refer to cases such as Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Mara38
thon Pipeline Co., 37 Thomas v. Union CarbideAgricultural Products Co.,
39 each of which inand Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor,
volved the issue of whether Congress has the power to delegate to persons
not appointed as federal judges the authority to decide disputes that fall
under the jurisdiction of the federal courts. In each of these cases, the parties
challenging the statutes argued that they were entitled to present their cases
to an article III judge.4°
The results in this group of cases are difficult to explain and categorize,
and, in contrast to the results in the delegation cases, the Court did not al34. Id. at 656-57.
35. 848 F.2d 211 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 491 (1988).
36. Postal Revenue and Federal Salary Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-206, § 223, 81 Stat. 613, 642-

44 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 351-361 (1988)).
37. 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
38. 473 U.S. 568 (1985).
39. 478 U.S. 833 (1986).
40. Schor, 478 U.S. at 838; Union Carbide, 473 U.S. at 582; Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 62.
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ways uphold the statute. In Northern Pipeline, the Court, through the combination of a four-Justice plurality opinion written by Justice Brennan and a
concurring opinion by Justice Rehnquist and in which Justice O'Connor
joined, rebuffed Congress' attempt to expand the functions of bankruptcy
judges, who are appointed for a fourteen year term rather than for life, can be
removed by means other than impeachment, are subject to salary reduction,
and therefore lack the protections of article 111.41 Although bankruptcy
judges are part of the judicial branch, the Court still viewed the statute as
invading the power of article III judges, albeit without any increase in power
to Congress. 42 However, because Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor agreed
only to the extent that the litigation at issue involved a traditional state law
claim, and their votes were necessary to achieve a majority, it is unclear how
43
widely the Northern Pipeline net will be cast.
On the other hand, the Court reached the opposite conclusion in a nearly
44
unanimous opinion in Thomas v. Union CarbideAgriculturalProducts Co.
In Thomas, the Court sustained a mandatory arbitration program for determining the monetary value of data that the Environmental Protection
Agency requires pesticide manufacturers to submit and which it then makes
available to other pesticide manufacturers. 4 5 The Court seemed unconcerned
about the arguable erosion of federal judicial power despite the fact that the
arbitrators, unlike the bankruptcy judges in Northern Pipeline, were not federal officials and the judicial review of their determinations was even more
limited than that which was available under the bankruptcy code.
Justice O'Connor, the author of the Union Carbide decision, forcefully expressed her concern about the erosion of federal judicial power in her major46
ity opinion in Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor, however.
Schor involved a challenge to the validity of a statute that allowed the Commodities Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), an independent agency
41. Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 53.
42. Id. at 84.
43. Since Congress has greater control over bankruptcy judges than article III judges, it is possible to argue that Northern Pipeline is analogous to Bowsher in that the Court was concerned in both
cases with the potential for improper congressional interference with the decisions of non-article III
judges and the Comptroller General. However, given the very different relationship between Congress and the Comptroller General, on the one hand, and Congress and several hundred bankruptcy
judges, on the other, it would have been entirely proper to conclude that the potential for congressional interference with decisions of bankruptcy judges was so slight that Bowsher could be distinguished, although there might be other bases for doubting whether bankruptcy judges were
sufficiently independent to do the job assigned to them in Northern Pipeline.
44. 473 U.S. 568 (1985).
45. Id. at 571-73, 589. Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment on standing grounds. Id. at
602-05 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment). Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun also concurred in the judgment but did not join the majority opinion. Id. at 594-602 (Brennan, J., with
Marshall & Blackmun, JJ., concurring in judgment).
46. 478 U.S. 833, 857 (1986).
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within the executive branch, to adjudicate a state common law counterclaim.
The objecting party in Schor relied on the ruling in Northern Pipeline that
only article III judges could provide a federal forum for deciding such questions. 47 The Court, however, upheld the statute and allowed federal, nonarticle III adjudication of state law claims, at least when the objecting
party-the original complainant in the CFTC proceeding-had initiated the
adjudicative proceeding and when the counterclaim involved the same basic
transaction as the original claim. 48 The Court did suggest, however, that
Congress could not remove all such cases from the purview of the federal
judiciary, but did not explain which ones could not be removed or why they
49
were a necessary part of the business of the federal courts.
Another side of the passive encroachment issue is at stake in cases challenging Congress' assignment of functions normally performed by the executive. Thus, in Morrison v. Olson,50 after first rejecting an appointments clause
challenge, the Court turned aside a claim that the judges who appointed the
independent counsel were improperly exercising supervisory authority over
the independent counsel, a function the opponents said could only be per5
formed by executive branch officials. ' The Court read the applicable statute
narrowly and sustained it, although it first expressed concern about assigning
52
to article III judges the role of supervising the independent counsel. The
Court held that under the statute the judges did not exceed their judicial
function, particularly in light of their ancillary powers available through the
appoint inferior officers,
appointments clause, which allows courts of law5to
3
branch.
even if the office is part of the executive
The Supreme Court rejected a similar challenge in Mistretta v. United
States.54 In this case the defendant claimed that Congress' placement of the
Sentencing Commission, three of whose seven members were article III
judges, in the judicial branch was improper because the Commission performed functions that, if they could be delegated at all, belonged to the executive branch. 55 The Supreme Court found no encroachment, relying on the
historical role of the courts in the sentencing process-although that role had
traditionally been on an individual, or retail, rather than a rule-making, or
wholesale, basis-and citing the fact that the judges were serving in their
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id. at 847.
Id. at 858.
Id.
487 U.S. 654 (1988).
Id. at 680-81.
Id. at 677-78.
Id. at 673-77.
109 S. Ct. 647 (1989).
Id. at 660-61.
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individual rather than judicial capacities. 56 In both Morrison and Mistretta,
that Congress had not sought to increase its own powers, but instead assigned new powers to other branches, undoubtedly made it possible for the
Court to sustain statutes that clearly would have been set aside if Congress
had granted itself or its agents those powers, or if the judiciary had assumed
them on its own.
C. UNDUE INTERFERENCE

Even when there has been no textual violation and one branch has not
exercised power given by the Constitution to another, separation of powers
problems may still exist if a statute "disrupts the proper balance between the
coordinate branches." '5 7 As the Court said in Nixon v. Administratorof GeneralServices,5 8 in such a case the Court must determine "the extent to which
[the statute] prevents the ... [b]ranch from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions," and then "determine whether that impact is justified
by an overriding need to promote objectives within the constitutional authority of Congress."' 59 The sole context in which this type of separation of powers challenge has arisen to date is through legislative restrictions on the
executive branch, generally on the President. It is also theoretically possible
that similar kinds of restrictions could be applied to the judicial branch, for
example, by requiring that the weekly conferences of the Supreme Court be
open to the press or the public.
Since the determination in each of these cases involves a balancing, it is
hardly surprising that the outcomes do not uniformly favor one branch or
the other and are not easy to predict. In Nixon, the Court was sharply divided over whether the requirement in the Presidential Materials and Recordings Act,60 which directed that all papers of former President Richard
Nixon be turned over to the National Archives for review and release, subject to certain exemptions, was an undue interference with the power of the
61
President to conduct his office and obtain confidential advice from his staff.
The Court upheld the statute, relying on the fact that the Archivist was a
professional within the executive branch, that the material at issue related to
the performance of official government functions, and that two Presidents
(Ford and Carter) had supported the law. 62 The Court left for future determination the applicability of the statute to specific documents that President
56. Id. at 664.

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Serv., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977).
433 U.S. 425 (1977).
Id.
44 U.S.C. §§ 3315-3324 (1988).
Nixon, 433 U.S. at 429, 443, 448-49.
Id. at 441.
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might or might not have been
Nixon claimed must be kept secret, and which
63
covered by the exemptions from disclosure.
In Morrison v. Olson, the alleged interference was caused by the President's
loss of control over the independent counsel, in particular his inability to fire
64
him, except through the Attorney General, and then only for cause. Chief
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the entire Court except Justice Scalia, upheld
the law, finding the need for independence and the desire to avoid the appearance of impropriety sufficient to warrant the limited nature of the intrusion. 65 The Court's opinion noted that the intrusion was only for the shortterm life of the particular independent counsel appointment and was limited
cause. 66
to one member of the executive branch, who still could be fired for
The result in Morrison is consistent with that in Humphrey's Executor v.
United States,67 which rejected President Roosevelt's separation of powers
challenge to the provisions limiting his ability to fire commissioners of the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) except for cause. But the method of analysis in Morrison is quite different and seems intended to supplant that in
Humphrey's Executor, which focused primarily on the legislative nature of
the FTC as a reason for distinguishing the case from Myers v. United
States,68 in which the Court only eight years earlier had spoken in broad
terms about the President's power to fire executive officers appointed by
him.

69

Two other undue interference cases, in which our office was counsel for the
party opposing the executive branch, reached the Supreme Court in the 1988
Term on direct appeals from the United States District Court for the District
of Columbia, which in both cases had struck down statutes on separation of
powers grounds. However, for different reasons, neither case produced a
separation of powers ruling. In the first, American Foreign Service Association v. Garfinkel,70 Congress had passed an appropriations rider to prevent
the executive branch from requiring employees with access to classified information to sign certain nondisclosure agreements that Congress believed contained inappropriate provisions that prevented employees from disclosing
63. Id. at 444-46.
64. 487 U.S. 654, 663 (1988).
65. Id. at 677, 693-97.

66. Id. at 672.
67. 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
68. 272 U.S. 52 (1926).

69. Id. at 161-64. In Morrison, the Supreme Court, correctly in my view, rejected a claim that
the case involved a congressional encroachment, based on the theory that every reduction in Presidential powers results in an increase in legislative power, even though Congress does not gain power
as it did with the legislative veto. 487 U.S. at 686. More importantly, Morrison clarified and simplified the process of analyzing cases in which Congress increases its own powers, and separated them
analytically from those in which Congress imposes restrictions on the other branches.
70. 109 S. Ct. 1693 (1989) (per curiam).
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either unclassified or improperly classified information which might prove
embarrassing to the executive branch. 7 1 Senior District Judge Gasch held
the statute unconstitutional as an invasion of the President's powers as Commander-in-Chief. 72 Judge Gasch did so without reference to Congress' substantial powers under the Constitution to declare war, to raise and support
the armies, and to make rules for the Armed Forces, as well as Congress'
power to control government spending, the specific method used in this instance to limit the nondisclosure agreements. In addition, there was no evidence presented regarding how the limitations imposed by the statute would
actually interfere with the President's ability to protect properly classified
information, and the record was devoid of evidence on many of the other
need for the statute against the level
factors that would go into balancing the
73
generate.
might
it
of interference that
On appeal, the Supreme Court did not reach any of the constitutional issues. Instead, its per curiam opinion vacated the decision below and remanded it for further consideration in light of certain intervening events that
mooted at least some aspects of the case. 74 The Court directed the district
court on remand to ensure that all aspects of the case were ripe and not
moot, to attempt to reconcile the statute with the Constitution, and to adjudicate the constitutional issues only if it first found specific violations of the
statute. 75 While the Court's opinion was not a ruling on the merits, it recognized that the questions presented in Garfinkel are far more subtle, and the
interests of Congress far more significant, than the district court believed.
76
In the second case, Public Citizen v. Department of Justice, five Justices
construed the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) so as not to apply
to the Judicial Selection Committee of the American Bar Association (ABA
77 The district
Committee), thereby avoiding any constitutional question.
court had held that the Department of Justice was violating FACA by
"utilizing" the ABA Committee to advise it on nominees for federal judgeships, without complying with the statute. 78 The court also found, however,
that the statute, so construed, violated separation of powers and the appointments clause because it interfered, in unspecified ways, with the President's
exclusive constitutional power to appoint federal judges, subject only to the
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id. at 1694-95.
688 F. Supp. 671, 683, 685 (D.D.C. 1988), vacated and remanded, 109 S. Ct. 1963 (1989).
Id. at 683-85.
109 S. Ct. 1693, 1693-98 (1989).

75. Id. at 1698. The case is now on remand, with the plaintiff attempting to show that the statute
produces a very low level of interference with executive authority and that it substantially advances
valid congressional interests, and with the executive taking the opposite position.
76. 109 S. Ct. 2558 (1989).
77. Id. at 2572-73.
78. Washington Legal Found. v. Department of Justice, 691 F. Supp. 483, 489 (D.D.C. 1988),
aff'd sub nom. Public Citizen v. Department of Justice, 109 S. Ct. 2558 (1989).
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advice and consent of the Senate.79
Three Justices rejected the government's statutory argument, but agreed
with the district court that, as applied, FACA was unconstitutional.80 To
reach that result, the Justices asserted that the district court's findings of
interference were not challenged by the plaintiffs, 8 despite the fact that the
plaintiff's brief devoted nearly eight pages to explaining how minimal any
statutory interference was and how most of the claims of interference were
dependent on the courts' rejecting the same statutory defenses to the openness requirements of FACA that seemed to be at the heart of the government's interference argument.8 2 While the Court's opinion in Public Citizen
makes no new separation of powers law, the willingness of three Justices to
accept the government's interference argument, with little or nothing to support it, at least suggests some increased rigidity8 3in the separation of powers
balancing tests applied in Nixon and Morrison.
III.

ASSESSING THE OUTCOMES

The discussion in Part II may be of help in analyzing the cases and in
thinking through possible approaches to future separation of powers issues,
but it does not attempt to assess the performance of the courts in any way.
Such an assessment could take the form of analyzing the opinions for their

legal craftsmanship, internal consistency, or consistency with one another.
That is not, however, the type of assessment I choose to make.
Instead, I wish to offer some normative judgments about the separation of
powers decisions of the Supreme Court, including some decisions not to decide a separation of powers question, in an attempt to evaluate whether the

results of those cases make sense in light of the underlying purpose of the
doctrine: to give the people a responsive, accountable, and nontyrannical
government. This assessment will not attempt to explain all of the Court's
separation of powers cases, or even all of the cases mentioned above; nor will
it attempt to discuss all of the factors that might go into such a comprehensive assessment. Rather, it will focus on the three questions discussed in the
79. Id at 491-93.
80. Public Citizen, 109 S. Ct. at 2580 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
81. Id. at 2584.
82. Brief for Appellant at 26-33, Public Citizen v. Department of Justice, 109 S. Ct. 2558 (1989)
(Nos. 88-429, 88-494).
83. Justice Scalia in all probability would also accept that position. He recused himself in Public
Citizen presumably because, when he was an Assistant Attorney General in 1974, he had rendered
an opinion that the statute as applied to the ABA Committee violated separation of powers. A.
Scalia, Memorandum Re Constitutionality of the Federal Advisory Committee Act at 5-7 (Dec. 1,
1974) (copy on fie at The Georgetown Law Journal). He was also the lone dissenter in Morrison,
suggesting that he would be willing to find interference at a far lower level than most, if not all, of
the other Justices. 487 U.S. 654, 697 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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introduction that seem to go to the heart of the judgment about the outcomes
in these cases.
A. HAS THE SUPREME COURT REFUSED TO ADAPT THE DOCTRINE OF
SEPARATION OF POWERS TO THE PROBLEMS OF TWENTIETH
CENTURY AMERICAN GOVERNMENT?

When the Court has found either violations of the text of the Constitution
or active encroachment, it has struck down the challenged scheme without
inquiring into its possible benefits, with the result that the Court is viewed as
unduly rigid by some. The two leading candidates for a charge of "failure to
adapt to modem American necessities" are Immigration & Naturalization
Service v. Chadhas4 and Bowsher v. Synar, 5 in which the Court set aside
major decisions of the elected branch about the necessities of proper government. In Chadha the Court overturned Congress' use of the legislative veto
device to limit administrative discretion, which many observers both in and
out of Congress believed had gone out of control.86 In Bowsher the Court
rejected Congress' choice of the person (office) that it considered the most
appropriate to be in charge of the deficit reduction and to ensure a balanced
result in carrying out its will. 8 7 Indeed, President Reagan, whom the Department of Justice supposedly represented in challenging the law in Bowsher, was an early and enthusiastic supporter of Congress' effort to balance
the budget by using the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings device, and he signed the
bill into law with only a modest constitutional reservation.88 Moreover,
President Reagan also supported the legislative veto as a candidate,8 9 but was
persuaded to take a different position once in office, thereby joining his predecessors in office who opposed the veto, while sometimes acquiescing in its
inclusion in especially desired legislation 90

Some view the opinions in Chadha and Bowsher, both of which were written by Chief Justice Burger, as taking an unduly rigid or mechanical approach to separation of powers and showing a lack of sympathy for
Congress' problems in trying to pass broad statutes and see that they are
executed properly. While there is some truth to this allegation, it overlooks
84.
85.
86.
87.

462 U.S.
478 U.S.
Chadha,
Bowsher,

919 (1983).
714 (1986).
462 U.S. at 944-45.
478 U.S. at 720.

88. President's Statement on Signing H.R.J. Res. 372 into Law, 21 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc.

1490-91 (Dec. 12, 1985).
89. Lubasch, Judge is Urged to Dismiss Westway Bid for a Landfill Permit, N.Y. Times, June 23,
1983, at B4, col. 1; Brown, Reagan 'Reforms' Would Tighten CongressionalGrip on Agencies, Wash.
Post, Oct. 12, 1980, at A4, col. 1.
90. See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 942 n. 13; see also Kurtz, President Yields to Congress, Signs College
Student Aid Measure, Wash. Post, Oct. 15, 1982, at A3, col. 4.
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several important facts. For example, in the case of the legislative veto, Congress was poised to launch a full-scale invasion of the executive branch by
putting a legislative veto provision on every regulation of every federal
agency, and on a host of internal agency decisions as well, not to mention a
number of legislative vetoes that would be applied directly to Presidential
decisions. One need not applaud the judicial craftsmanship of the Chadha
opinion to agree that Congress had gone too far and that the holding was
unavoidable unless the Court was prepared to allow one House, or more realistically one committee or subcommittee of Congress (or even their staffs), to
dictate to executive agencies how their programs should be run. Similarly,
while the specific encroachment in Bowsher was certainly of lesser magnitude
than the legislative veto, allowing the Comptroller General to carry out the
budget-cutting functions at issue in Bowsher could have opened the way to a
Chadha-like attack on the powers of the executive branch, using the Comptroller General rather than the legislative veto.
One other opinion is open to this challenge of failing to adapt to the changing governmental needs of twentieth-century America: the Court's refusal in
Northern Pipeline to allow bankruptcy judges to perform adjudicative functions assigned to them by Congress because the assignment violated article
III of the Constitution. There is much force to the portion of Justice White's
dissenting opinion criticizing Justice Brennan's plurality opinion for drawing
the line at three exceptions to the requirement that article III judges must
preside over adjudications in a federal forum,9 1 without explaining why three
is the magic number instead of four or five. On the other hand, Justice White
is on far less secure ground in explaining what line he would draw, or why
the case before the Court in Northern Pipeline, which embodied a traditional
state common law question, should fall on the non-article III side of the line.
What saves the result in Northern Pipeline from overburdening federal
judges is not the opinion itself, but the Court's subsequent ruling in Schor
that the parties can consent to a non-article III tribunal. To be sure, there is
language in Justice O'Connor's opinion in Schor suggesting that article III
would preclude such an arrangement in some circumstances, but the basic
thrust of her opinion is that consent will resolve most of the problems in nonarticle III adjudications. 92 Thus, in the bankruptcy context, federal judges
have not been overwhelmed after Northern Pipeline, largely because the consent mechanism Congress subsequently built into the system 93 has allowed
most cases to go to bankruptcy judges with the parties consent. It remains to
be seen how far "consent" can be implied. For example, if Congress sought
to imply consent in a highly coercive situation, Schor might no longer gov91. 458 U.S. 50, 103-05 (1982) (White, J., dissenting).
92. 478 U.S. 833, 850-51 (1988).

93. 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(2) (1988).
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ern. In at least one such instance, Union Carbide,94 the Court declined to
rest its result on consent grounds, but instead found the adjudication to be
within the previously-recognized exception for administrative tribunals. 95
Despite these examples, however, there seems to be little basis for any
charge that the Supreme Court has completely refused to adapt its separation
of powers jurisprudence to the realities of twentieth century American government. Although I have other problems with the decisions in Humphrey v.
Baker, regarding federal pay, in Synar v. United States, regarding the
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act, and in Mistretta v. United States, regarding
the Sentencing Commission, no one can accuse those courts of being tied to
1789 as they approved mechanisms that are a far cry from anything ever
imagined by the Framers. And while I support the Court's decision to uphold the independent counsel statute in Morrison, it is hard to imagine that
same result 200 years ago, or even earlier this century.
B. HAVE CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATIONS GONE OUT OF CONTROL?

As yet, there has been no official burial for the doctrine of excessive delegation, and the Supreme Court still pays lip service to the "intelligible principle" test for delegations enunciated in J. W. Hampton Jr. & Co. v. United
States.96 But for all intents and purposes the doctrine is a dead letter. Indeed, at this time, it would be almost a violation of rule 11 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure for an attorney to make an excessive delegation
claim.

97

The current state of the law can be illustrated by taking examples from
both ends of the excessive delegation spectrum: instances in which Congress
includes many specific directions in a delegation, and those in which it includes almost none. Delegations falling at both ends of the spectrum have
been upheld. For example, under the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act, despite numerous statutory directions as to how cuts should be made, Congress
placed no controls on the estimation of the anticipated rate of interest, one of
the key figures needed to estimate the deficit. 9 8 As a result, even if every
economist in the country, the Office of Management and Budget, and the
Congressional Budget Office all agreed that interest rates would average eight
percent, the Comptroller General would have been entirely free under the
statute to designate any interest rate, such as two percent or forty percent.
Moreover, not only did the statute contain no controls on the Comptroller's
94. 473 U.S. 568 (1988).
95. Id. at 593-94.
96. 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928).
97. Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for sanctions for the filing of claims
that are not "warranted by existing law." FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
98. 2 U.S.C. § 901 (1988).
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discretion in estimating interest rates, it also explicitly made the Comptroller's determinations in this area judicially non-reviewable. 99 Although there
are numerous controls in the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act on certain decisions, there are no controls on the discretion, now exercised by the Office of
Management and Budget, in deciding virtually all of the crucial factors necessary for estimating the deficit.
A similarly broad delegation is present in the statute creating the Sentencing Commission and directing the establishment of mandatory sentencing
guidelines. 100 Like the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act, the statute contains a
plethora of statutory directions, but leaves virtually all of the major policy
choices entirely to the discretion of the Sentencing Commission. For example, under the statute, the Commission could decide that all drug traffickers
should receive the maximum sentence allowed by law, or that everyone convicted of income tax evasion must serve sixty days in jail and pay the maximum fine allowable, on the theory that drug trafficking can be deterred only
by stiff sentences and that tax evasion is an economic crime which can be
deterred only by a combination of jail and heavy fines. Similarly, the Commission could abolish probation for everyone, or make probation mandatory
for all first time offenders, except in those cases in which minimum
mandatory sentences are prescribed by statute. Furthermore, if the Commission were so inclined, it could decide that pornography was an extraordinarily serious federal offense and require judges to impose the maximum
sentence allowable by law in every pornography case. At the same time, the
Commission could decide that perjury and conspiracies to violate civil rights
were trivial offenses and require judges to impose the minimum sentence permitted. Although in fact the Commission has made rather different judgments from these, nothing in the statute would have precluded it from
making any of these determinations, or any of a myriad of others that would
have radically altered the federal justice system in our country.
The delegation in the Federal Salary Act of 1985101 can be seen as falling
at the opposite end of the delegation spectrum. Under this law, the President
has the sole authority to determine the salary level for high ranking officials
in the executive, legislative, and judicial branches, and his only statutory direction is to prescribe salary levels that he "deems advisable."' 0 2 Thus, the
President can raise salaries to any amount he wants, or, with the exception of
the salaries of federal judges, which are protected by article III, he can cut
salaries to the bone. The only way that Congress can alter the President's
personal preference is by passing a new statute, presumably over his veto.
99. Id. § 922(h).
100. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3559 (1988); id. §§ 991-998.
101. 2 U.S.C. § 358 (1988).

102. Id.
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Although there is a commission that makes recommendations to the President, the President is not bound by its advice. 10 3 In fact, in 1987 President
Reagan changed most of the dollar amounts recommended by the
commission and also altered the salaries in a way that upset the historical
balances among various officials in the different branches.1o4 All of this was
entirely proper and not subject to judicial review or to any limitation other
than that the President not deem those changes which he chose to make
"inadvisable." 10 5
To be sure, Congress did mandate that the Sentencing Commission follow
public rulemaking procedures before promulgating its guidelines,1°6 which
serves the function of ensuring procedural fairness and an opportunity to be
heard. Even if the substance of these guidelines is not subject to judicial
review, the public input into them is surely an improvement over the absence
of any such procedures, the situation which the Court criticized in Schecter
Poultry, although it does not answer the substantive objections to an overbroad delegation. But no such procedures were available in Synar, and those
procedures required under the Federal Salary Act are minimal and inapplicable to the only decision that counts-that of the President.
The Court's unwillingness to strike down these delegations is understandable if one views separation of powers doctrine essentially as an effort to ensure that no one branch has encroached upon the territory of another, which
in this instance would mean that Congress' prerogatives had not been invaded. Under such a theory, because Congress does not care about protecting its authority, and has voluntarily divested itself of its own powers, the
courts should not interfere. If self-protection of the branches is the goal of
the doctrine of separation of powers, then it may not matter that Congress
has chosen to give away its authority to another branch of government, subject only to recapture if it can pass another statute.
But if one takes into account the interests of the citizens in the separation
of powers, the result is rather different. The purpose of separation of powers
becomes not simply to protect the interests of the three branches, but also to
protect the right of the people to be governed in accordance with the compact that they made through the Framers by approving the Constitution.
This compact is intended to ensure that those whom we elect as lawmakers
will actually make the fundamental policy choices. When elected officials do
not make these fundamental choices, but instead delegate them to the Presi103. Id.
104. Humphrey v. Baker, 665 F. Supp. 23, 25, 29 (D.D.C. 1987), aff'd, 848 F.2d 211 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 488 U.S. 966 (1988).
105. It might be argued that the delegation should have been upheld because it did not affect the
substantive rights of anyone (other than taxpayers or perhaps the legislators who wanted to vote on
the raise), but that was not the rationale on which the law was sustained.
106. 28 U.S.C. § 994(x) (1988).
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dent, or to appointed subordinates, this basic compact is broken, and the
people do not receive the representative, accountable government to which
they are entitled. Although one could also argue that congressional abdication of power is harmful to Congress' own interests both in the long and in
the short terms, the case for controlling delegations is a strong one on its
own, based solely on principles of responsive and accountable government.
In my opinion, the principal reason why courts have been unwilling to find
a delegation to be excessive is that they have been comparing one delegation
with another in an effort to decide how much delegation is too much. The
difficulty in using this approach is that each statute is different, and it is
therefore impossible to make meaningful comparisons among the variety of
broad delegations that are challenged in court. As a result, if the Supreme
Court continues to proceed along its present path, eventually all delegations
will be upheld, if for no other reason than if one is struck down, it will be
almost impossible not to slide backwards, striking down each subsequent delegation, in precisely the same way that the courts have been moving forward
building on prior delegations that have been upheld.
There does seem to me to be one way to revive the nondelegation doctrine
without wholly tying the hands of Congress. Nondelegation issues arise almost exclusively in circumstances in which administrative agencies or others
are authorized to make rules, or similar across-the-board determinations,
such as under the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act or the Federal Salary Act.
In these circumstances, to assure the people that the legislative direction has
been followed by the administrative rulemakers, the Court should hold that
any delegation that does not provide the courts with standards sufficient for
determining whether the statutory directions were met is per se excessive.
Under this approach, if Congress has not given the agency sufficient guidance, and the Court is consequently unable to determine whether the
agency in fact followed the law, then the delegation is excessive. Stated another way, a statute should not be struck down simply because Congress has
given an agency a wide range of choices, but should be set aside only in those
instances in which the court cannot determine whether the agency's decision
fell within the bounds of the delegation. 107
Because the purpose of reviving the nondelegation doctrine is to require
Congress to make basic policy choices, the doctrine would apply to decisions
like those about the proper levels of federal pay and the appropriate ranges of
107. In my view, Chief Justice Rehnquist was in error in his dissenting opinion in the Cotton
Dust Case, when he suggested that the delegation there had gone too far. American Textile Mfrs.
Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 543-48 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). That is so not because
Congress had specifically envisioned the details of the standard under challenge, but because the
framework for a standard covering a hazard such as cotton dust was plainly contemplated and
desired by Congress, although its precise contours were equally plainly not included in the statute.
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sentences for convicted criminals. There would be no need to apply the nondelegation doctrine, however, in situations in which the choices involve some
balancing of policies, but the goal of the law is not to affect substantive
rights. The principal impact of this exception to the doctrine would be in the
area of procedure, in which the Supreme Court, for example, working
through its advisory committees, promulgates binding procedural rules without congressional guidance of the kind that I have suggested is needed for
making substantive rules. As long as Congress continues to prohibit the
Court from issuing rules that "abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive
right,"' 10 8 the promulgation of these procedural rules would present no delegation problems.
Such an approach also would not require that all types of agency decisions
be subject to judicial review. It would plainly be proper to insulate from
judicial review decisions about whether to bring a law enforcement proceeding, as the Court recognized in Heckler v. Chaney.109 Similarly, an agency
authorized to choose among several hundred grant applications, each of
which met the minimum standards established by the agency, would not be
stopped because a court could not determine whether the agency had chosen
the most qualified from among those who met the minimum criteria for grant
recipients.
Under this test, the delegations in all three of the statutes described
above-the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act, the Sentencing Reform Act, and
the Federal Salary Act-would not withstand scrutiny. In none of these statutes is there any possibility of judicial review of the key determinations
made, and almost anything that could have been done would have been
within the statutory framework.
What would such an approach to separation of powers mean? For balancing the budget or setting federal salaries, Congress could simply vote on these
issues itself, as it has done in the past. For other issues, like the sentencing
guidelines, Congress might have to appoint an advisory committee to do the
ground work before Congress would be in a position to vote to approve, disapprove, or modify the committee's recommendations. In other situations,
such an approach would require Congress to do more than it has been doing
or to delegate fewer decisions to administrative agencies, but neither result
would be disastrous, and either would probably make the law-making function substantially better than it is now. Most importantly, this approach
would return responsibility and accountability to our elected officials. It
would prevent them from ducking the hard choices, as they have done, by
either writing detailed but largely insignificant criteria into statutes, or by
108. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1988).
109. 470 U.S. 881 (1985).
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delegating the decision-making power to the President or other official with
permission to do whatever he or she wants. As it now stands our legislators
no longer have to make policy; they merely have to decide when to delegate
to the other branches the power to do so. It is hard to imagine that the
Framers would have created a representative government based on such a
principle.
C. HAVE WE FOUND THE RIGHT JUDICIAL NICHE?

The question of whether the judicial role has been properly defined involves two separate inquiries: whether too much of the judicial power has
been assigned to others, and whether federal judges have been assigned powers that do not properly belong to the judiciary. The answer to the first ques110
tion seems, by and large, to be no, and to the second, seems to be yes.
The Union Carbide and Schor cases represent the two most recent examples of the Supreme Court's approval of legislative decisions to deny litigants
an article III forum. In both cases there is no doubt that the disputes were
capable of judicial resolution consistent with the case or controversy requirement of article III; the question, therefore, was whether other forums were
also acceptable. In both cases the Court ruled that they were.I 1 '
Under the "three team approach" to separation of powers, the only inquiry would be whether the courts whose powers were being reduced opposed the laws. After all, if the affected branch does not object, why should a
private party be able to oppose the delegation when the other two branches
have also agreed? Indeed, in Union Carbide and Schor, the legislative branch
was the source of the reductions in judicial power, and the executive branch
supported them, not only at the time that the laws were enacted, but also
12
when they were challenged in court.'
This view, however, seems too narrow. The federal courts were not created merely for the purpose of employing those chosen by the President and
confirmed by the Senate to hold article III offices. Rather, the federal courts
were created for the benefit of the parties, to provide a neutral forum for fair
and impartial adjudication of certain kinds of controversies. The proper
question, therefore, ought to be whether a person with a dispute that is to be
resolved in a federal forum is entitled to have that forum be presided over by
110. This article will not discuss whether the courts have improperly expanded or improperly
contracted notions of justiciability to bring within their sphere either too much or too little litigation, consistent with the separation of powers aspects of the case or controversy requirement in
article III. Instead, this article focuses on whether others have been given judicial-like powers that
should remain in the judiciary and on whether the judiciary has been given powers that properly
belong to other branches.
111. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 851 (1986); Thomas v. Union
Carbide Agricultural Products Co., 473 U.S. 568, 590 (1985).
112. Schor, 478 U.S. at 841; Union Carbide, 473 U.S. at 590.
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a person with the protections of life tenure and a prohibition against salary
reduction, which are the hallmarks of article III independence. The answer
to that question has little or nothing to do with judicial preferences; in fact,
many judges would be pleased to get rid of some types of cases and hand
them off to magistrates, bankruptcy judges, or other non-article III
adjudicators.
Nonetheless, the answers to the questions presented in Union Carbide and
Schor need not be any different under this approach. It seems clear to me
that Schor was correctly decided under either approach because the objecting
party consented to a non-article III forum by filing a complaint with the
CFTC.1 1 3 It is entirely fair and reasonable for Congress to condition the
right of Mr. Schor to avail himself of a federal administrative forum upon his
willingness to have all matters rising out of the same transaction adjudicated
in that forum. The consent theory undercuts much of Justice O'Connor's
discussion, which suggests that there are limits on Congress' ability to remove cases from the federal courts 1 4 and assumes that diversity or statutory
cases were in federal court before Congress put them there.
Although constructive consent by the affected party seems to me to be a
complete answer in Schor, it cannot supply the necessary ingredient in Union
Carbide because the mandatory licensing system at issue in the case was so
plainly coercive as to negate any notion of consent.1 15 It is the mandatory
aspect of Union Carbide, coupled with the fact that disputes are resolved by
arbitrators who are not even federal officials, and whose decisions are virtually immune from judicial review, that makes this decision most troubling to
me. The Court's rather mechanical application of the statutory right of action exception to article III jurisdiction and its failure to acknowledge the
substantial interest of the objecting litigant in having the dispute resolved by
an independent article III judge make the decision problematic. There are
some mitigating factors in the case, such as the complexity and fact-bound
nature of the issue, which make the result more defensible. However, the
Court's reasoning, when viewed in light of its unwillingness to deny an article
III forum to the objecting party in Northern Pipeline, makes the rationale, if
not the result, difficult to accept.
On the question of whether judges have been given powers for which they
are constitutionally ill-suited, I conclude that the Court has not reached a
proper balance in several respects. Although one could argue that the supervisory role of the special division in the independent counsel statute is improper, the Supreme Court's narrow reading of that law probably makes the
minimal additional functions that the judges are required to carry out accept113. Schor, 478 U.S. at 838, 845.
114. Id. at 850-57.
115. Union Carbide, 473 U.S. at 573.
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able, and certainly makes them of no great moment. Unfortunately, the results in other cases are far less satisfactory.
For me, a much greater problem is presented by the roles taken on by the
article III judges on the Sentencing Commission. As the Supreme Court recognized, the job of the Commission is to make difficult policy choices in order to create a fair scheme of sentencing for persons convicted of federal
crimes.' 16 The correct policy choices are not obvious, and in the end many
of the choices reflect only the personal preferences of the Commission members. The discretionary nature of these decisions is underscored by the statute's requirement that no more than four members of the Commission can be
of the same political party,' 17 which evidences Congress' recognition that the
choices the Commission makes are political in the best sense of the wordthey involve value judgments, rather than partisan politics.
It is the political nature of these determinations, however, that makes assigning these functions to article III judges seem entirely inappropriate.
Although it is argued that judges were included in the Commission for their
expertise, there was no requirement in the statute that the judicial members
of the Commission be district judges who are experienced in sentencing, and
none of the judges chosen would rank among the members of the federal
bench whose sentencing backgrounds made them the most qualified to serve
in this role. It seems more likely, however, that Congress included judges on
the Commission and placed the Commission in the judicial branch to suggest
to the public that the Commission's function was merely to rationalize and
systematize the sentencing process, a role in which the judicial experience
would be invaluable. While no doubt some of the long process of sentencing
reform involved those kinds of decisions, the major and the most contentious
part of the process dealt with the policy choices, in which horse-trading between judges and nonjudges on the Commission took place in order to reach
a political accommodation that was acceptable to the Commission as a

whole. "18
116. Mistretta v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 647, 657, 665 (1989).
117. 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (1988).
118. The political aspects of the Commission's work have become even more apparent now that
it is trying to decide on appropriate sentences for corporations found guilty of federal crimes. See

Strausser, CorporateSentences Draw Fire;Big Business Attacks Proposals,Nat'l Law Journal, Mar.
12, 1990, at 3, col. 1; Etzioni, Going Soft on CorporateCrime, Wash. Post, Apr. 1, 1990, at C3, col.
1. It is more than a little ironic that Andrew Frey, one of the attorneys protesting the Commission's

proposals, was co-counsel representing the Commission in defending its implementing statute
against challenges of excess delegation. Frey and others have now made the similar charge that the
Commission is proceeding without statutory guidance and without prior empirical support for the
path it is espousing. This charge was made by opponents of the Commission in pointing out that it
had markedly increased sentences for individuals in certain areas because it believed that prior
sentences were too lenient. Brief for Petitioner at 9, Mistretta v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 647
(1989) (Nos. 87-1904, 87-7028).
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In my opinion, this is an inappropriate role for article III judges. With life
tenure and protections against salary reduction, article III judges are looked
upon to protect all of us against the political forces that sometimes oppress
minorities and do violence to the Constitution. Bringing judges out of their
judicial capacities, and moving them into a policy-making role inevitably undermines the judiciary's limited cache of independence, even if the erosion is
only through three of the nearly 700 federal judges.11 9 It is not an answer to
suggest, as the Court did, that the judges participated in the Commission not
as members of a court, but as individuals.' 20 A judge with lifetime tenure
does not cease being a judge simply by removing his or her robes, or taking
on the additional title of Commissioner for a period of time.' 2 1 Although the
Court tried to limit its ruling in Mistretta to the sentencing area in which
courts have long had a major role, it remains to be seen whether this limitation will survive if Congress again reaches into the federal judiciary for "neutral" but experienced individuals to solve difficult political problems.
If viewed from the "three team approach" to separation of powers, Congress' decision to assign added duties to the federal judiciary, principally at
the expense of itself, seems of no concern. If Congress is willing to relinquish
some of its own powers, the judges are willing to accept them, and the President supports the law, both in the legislative and judicial arenas, who cares?
However, if one views separation of powers as protection for the people and
not for the branches of government, a different result is reached. If the neutrality of judges is seen as a benefit not only for the judicial branch, but also
for the people who come before it, and if the judges' removal from the political process is intended to ensure that neutrality, then there is a loss to the
people when Congress assigns federal judges roles that are inconsistent with
the role of article III adjudicators.
Perhaps it is not surprising that the Supreme Court found these arguments
unpersuasive. It was, after all, article III judges who were determining
whether article III judges can continue to be fair and impartial in their judicial role, despite their role in issuing rules governing federal sentences. It is a
rare person who can recognize that he or she cannot take on added duties
without conflicting with existing ones. How many times, for instance, have
individual lawyers said that the rules prohibiting the commingling of funds
119. As of November 4, 1989, there were 743 authorized federal judgeships with 59 vacancies.
1990 JUDICIAL STAFF DIRECTORY 555.

120. Mistretta, 109 S. Ct. at 671.
121. When I tried to make a similar point at oral argument in Mistretta, Chief Justice Rehnquist
suggested that my analysis sounded rather like the aphorism "guns don't kill people, people kill
people." My response was perhaps more polite than on point, for it seemed to me then and now
that this aphorism is no more viable than the Court's distinction between judges and courts in its
opinion. Transcript of Oral Argument at 32-33, Mistretta v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 647 (1989)
(Nos. 87-1904, 87-7028).
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are not made for them, thinking that they are too honest and principled not
to return the money when their financial crises pass? It is for this reason that
conflict-of-interest rules for lawyers are strict, not because most of us are
dishonest, but because too often we cannot see that our independence has
been subtly affected by our relations with others. Although this may partially explain the Court's reasoning in Mistretta, it does not justify Congress'
decision to put judges into this political role, nor the Court's decision to
approve it. If we wish to protect the people by maintaining an independent
judiciary, we must keep it independent and not allow it to expand its powers
beyond those clearly within the ambit of article III.

IV. A FEW FURTHER SUGGESTIONS
Most of the suggestions in Part III are directed to the judiciary and do not
seem likely to be adopted in any significant respect. There are two other
branches that have a major, in fact the primary, role in the creation of the
situations that lead to separation of powers confrontations. Before turning to
what the executive and legislative branches might do to address separation of
powers issues, it is worth inquiring why there have been so many separation
of powers cases in recent years.
Part of the cause of the increase in separation of powers litigation is that
the courts have shown an increased willingness to accept arguments based on
the doctrine. It is not surprising that litigants have been encouraged to raise
appointments clause challenges after Buckley, congressional encroachment
challenges after Chadha, or denial of an article III forum challenges after
Northern Pipeline. A lawyer who failed to raise these claims might well be
guilty of malpractice.
The success of separation of powers challenges may explain why litigants
raise these claims, but it does not explain how we got to the place where
separation of powers claims have become such a significant part of the legal
landscape. Although others may see the origins of the problem in the increased divisiveness between the major political parties, or the increased acrimony between the White House and Capitol Hill, it seems to me that the
principal cause is Congress' increasing inability or refusal to make hard
choices and reach accommodations in a way that actually resolves difficult
problems. The legislative veto was a product of Congress' unwillingness to
put meaningful statutory restraints on the agencies-seeking both the glory
from passing fine-sounding laws and the power to undo them if they do not
turn out the way that Congress intended. The Gramm-Rudman-Hollings
Act was a response to Congress' inability to reduce the deficit by refusing to
cut popular programs or raise taxes, not to Congress' inability to write budgets, for Congress continued to do that even after the law was passed. The
Federal Salary Act was the product of a loss of congressional will and a

HeinOnline -- 79 Geo. L.J. 306 1990-1991

1990]

A NON-POWER LOOKS AT SEPARATION OF POWERS

307

desire to make someone else take the political heat for raising the salaries of
members of Congress.
To be sure, the weakening of the party system and the loss of power by
leaders in Congress have made the process of forging a consensus more difficult. In at least some situations, however, the absence of political backbone
does not appear to be the cause of the problem. For example, the Northern
Pipeline controversy arose largely because of efforts to minimize the expansion of the federal judiciary, while still effectively handling bankruptcy matters. Nonetheless, it is by-and-large the case that separation of powers cases
arise because Congress is trying to find a procedural gimmick to avoid hard,
substantive choices. It is the presence of these congressional gimmicks more
than anything else that has produced the major separation of powers challenges of the last fifteen years.122
Another cause of the increase in separation of powers litigation is the willingness of the executive branch to claim "undue interference" whenever
Congress passes a law that arguably touches on one of its constitutional prerogatives. For example, while various Presidents had been unhappy with the
role of the Comptroller General, Attorney General Edwin Meese took the
opportunity to take the issue to court in Ameron, Inc. v. United States Army
Corps of Engineers. 23 At issue in Ameron was the Competition in Contracting Act, 124 which gave the Comptroller General the power to review bid
protests and make recommendations, but not decisions, regarding them.' 25
The statute also put a mandatory ninety-day hold on all contract awards that
were subject to bid protests, and gave the Comptroller the power to extend
the time if necessary to review the case, or to reduce the time if the claim
122. The Justice Department has shown that it is not above giving into gimmicks, even when the
result is an aggrandizement of congressional power. Recently, the executive branch decided that it
wanted to be relieved of the burden of running Dulles and National Airports, which serve the
Washington, D.C. area, and of raising the money to pay for needed improvements. Citizens for the
Abatement of Aircraft Noise v. Metropolitan D.C. Airports Auth., 718 F. Supp. 974, 976 (D.D.C.
1989). The Secretary of Transportation established an advisory commission that proposed creating
a new airports authority, to be formed under the laws of Virginia and the District of Columbia,
which would receive a long-term lease of the airports from the federal government. Id. The House
of Representatives insisted that a review board, consisting of nine members of Congress, be given
the power to veto all major decisions of the airport authority. Id. at 977-78. The Justice Department issued an opinion approving the review board with the result that, as one House Member put
it, "We are getting our cake and eating it too." 132 CONG. REc. HII,100 (daily ed. Oct. 15, 1986)
(remarks by Rep. Smith). A separation of powers challenge to the review board was rejected by the
district court, Citizensfor the Abatement ofAircraft Noise, 718 F. Supp. at 986, but the D.C. Circuit
reversed and held the statute unconstitutional, No. 89-7182 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 26, 1990), even though
the Department of Justice intervened in support of the review board.
123. 809 F.2d 979 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. dismissed, 488 U.S. 918 (1988).
124. Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 1175 (1984) (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3556
(1988).
125. 31 U.S.C. § 3553 (1988).
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126 Instead of waiting to see whether the
could be disposed of more quickly.
Comptroller in fact ever extended the time, or whether Congress would fix
the problem in a way satisfactory to both branches, the Attorney General
the statute.1 27
simply directed government agencies not to comply with
When a bid protester objected to an agency's failure to comply with the Act,
the Attorney General raised the full specter of separation of powers, even
128 Although there
though the issue was largely, if not entirely, theoretical.
may be constitutional problems in the portion of the Act that allows the
protester,1 29
Comptroller General to award attorney's fees to a successful bid
I seriously doubt that the doctrine of separation of powers was necessary to
deal with the Ameron dispute. How little was at stake in Ameron is underscored by the fact that once Congress passed a statute which eliminated the
Comptroller General's power to extend or shorten the time frame for deciddismissed the certiorari
ing bid protests, the Solicitor General voluntarily
1 30
granted.
had
Court
petition that the Supreme
Other separation of powers challenges raised by the Justice Department
also seem to be based on a hair-trigger approach to protecting executive pre1 31
rogatives. In Public Citizen v. Burke, the court of appeals summarily 1regovernment. 32
jected the separation of powers argument advanced by the
The government argued unsuccessfully that it was unconstitutional for Congress to require former President Nixon to sue to overturn decisions of the
Archivist rejecting his claims of executive privilege, instead of accepting
them and requiring the requesters of Presidential documents to go to
133
Similarly, one questions the necessity of the Department of Juscourt.
tice's throwing its full weight against the constitutionality of the independent
counsel statute in Morrison v. Olson, when others were ready and able to take
it on.
Similarly, the government launched immediate full scale separation of
powers objections to the statutes at issue in American Foreign Service Associa135 While
tion v. Garfinke1 34 and Public Citizen v. Department of Justice.
there may be separation of powers issues with respect to some aspects of
126. Id. § 3554(a); Ameron, 809 F.2d at 985 n.5.
127. Ameron. 809 F.2d at 991 n.8.
128. See id at 987.
129. 31 U.S.C. § 3554(c)(1)(A) (1988).

130. United States Army Corp. of Eng'r v. Ameron, 109 S. Ct. 297 (1988) (dismissing writ of
certiorari). In fact, the change will likely bring more harm than good to the executive branch,
because the Comptroller will no longer be able to shorten, as well as extend, the 90 day review
period, which suggests how little the law interfered with the processes of the executive branch.
131. 843 F.2d 1473, 1480 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
132. Id at 1478-80.
133. Id.-at 1480.
134. 109 S. Ct. 1693 (1989).
135. 109 S. Ct. 2558 (1989).
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those laws, it would have been far more consistent with the President's constitutional duty "to take care that the laws shall be faithfully executed"1 36 to
have at least attempted to implement the laws in a manner consistent with
the statutes, and object on a separation of powers ground only if there was a
serious impediment to his ability to carry out his constitutional functions. In
several of these cases, Presidential prerogatives have been invoked by middle
level Justice Department officials; it would be far preferable if only the President, or perhaps the Attorney General in the President's absence, were permitted to decide to attack a statue on constitutional grounds.
Another reason that Congress becomes embroiled in separation of powers
lawsuits is that too often it does not look for separation of powers problems
during the legislative process. This charge is most clearly illustrated in the
final version of the Sentencing Commission contained in the Sentencing Reform Act.1 37 Although the general proposal for a sentencing commission
had been pending for over seven years, the final bill was never subjected to a
detailed separation of powers review by either Congress or the executive
branch prior to its passage. Some of these problems might be avoided if Congress gave separation of powers issues serious thought during the legislative
debates. Perhaps what Congress needs is an independent adviser to provide
expert opinions on avoiding constitutional problems. At the least, Congress
should ask the executive branch for its views in advance so that they are
known and, to the extent possible, taken into account. Although these two
steps would not eliminate separation of powers disputes, they might cut
down their number or make them more manageable, and make those statutes
that do raise separation of powers issues easier to defend.
Sometimes Congress, or at least many of its members, appears not to care
about separation of powers issues. This was surely the case in the days preceding the passage of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act when the issue addressed by Congress was politics, with virtually no concern about the
constitutional question. This was also true of the legislative veto. Until the
Supreme Court said that the veto was unconstitutional, the separation of
powers issues were brushed aside by Congress as someone else's concern,
even though members of Congress also take an oath to uphold the Constitution. In marked contrast, the constitutional issues in the United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act of 1988 were given careful
examination before the law was approved.1 38 That Act also quite sensibly
contained a provision for expedited judicial review of the constitutional issues and a careful contingency plan in case any part is declared
136. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, c. 4.
137. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3586 (1988); 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (1988).
138. See H.R. REP.No. 816, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 4, at 4-16 (1988).
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unconstitutional. 39
Finally, let me suggest to Congress that even if the nondelegation doctrine
is constitutionally moribund, it still embodies a political lesson that Congress
should heed. I cite as the prime example the judicial upholding of the Federal Salary Act,40 followed by the revolt by the American people in January
1989 when Congress sought to use the Act to increase its pay by more than
fifty percent.1 4 1 While the people were outraged by the amount of the increase, they were equally upset by Congress' unwillingness to stand up and
vote for it. Although it was the attempt to avoid a vote rather than the
inadequate standards in the law that caused the public outcry, it was the
failure of the courts to insist upon a meaningful delegation in the underlying
statute that gave Congress the idea that it could get away with the ploy. It is
hard to imagine any action that Congress has undertaken in the last half
century that caused it more difficulty than its decision to duck the pay issue,
a fact that Congress has recognized by amending the statute so that it now
specifically requires roll call votes on all future Congressional pay increases.
If there were ever a lesson that the Constitution is the minimal requirement,
and not necessarily the acceptable level, this surely is it.
Not only do these legislative gimmicks fail in the short run, but in the long
run they are destructive of the very power that Congress seeks to maintain in
its battles with the executive branch. As the War Powers Resolution 42 and
Congress' unwillingness to exercise meaningful oversight over its implementation demonstrate, it is difficult for Congress to recapture power once it has
ceded it to the President, either directly or by default. If Congress insists on
shedding much of its power in so many areas, it is going to be virtually impossible to reclaim that power. It is only by shunning legislative gimmicks
and going back to basic principles of accountability that Congress can hope
to recapture its role in the governing process.
One of the problems in achieving reforms in this area is that there is no
established constituency looking after separation of powers issues. There are,
of course, individuals within the executive and legislative branches who
watch out for the institutional interests of their branches, and the judges who
hear separation of powers cases can perhaps protect the interests of the judiciary. However, that leaves out the people, some of whom may be seriously
affected by a particular separation of powers case, yet have no interest in the
issue generally. Perhaps some way can be found to educate the public on the
139. Id at 22-25.
140. See supra text accompanying notes 35-38.
141. Morin, Huge Majority in Poll Opposes 50% Raise for Top Officials, Wash. Post, Jan. 17,

1989, at Al, col. 1.
142. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (1982).
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importance of separation of powers issues so that when they arise they are
seen from a broader perspective than "how does this affect me."
V. CONCLUSION

Life is a series of choices. I believe that the Supreme Court has chosen
wisely in most, but not all, separation of powers cases. If I had to choose
between the present results-problems and all-and a situation in which all
of the key rulings came out the opposite way--converting all bad decisions to
good and vice versa-I would clearly prefer the status quo. The Court has at
least prevented the worst schemes from going forward. Most of what I see as
errors-allowing excessive delegations or permitting assignments of duties to
branches of the government that are institutionally ill-suited to handle
them-involve single statutes and do not apply to a whole range of governmental activities. Furthermore, there is always the hope that the lesson from
the congressional pay debate may persuade Congress that decision, not delegation, is the better part of valor. The present balance may not be optimal,
but it is a good deal better than it might have been without the Supreme
Court's intervention.
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